Case 1:20-cv-02578-BMC Document 76 Filed 04/28/22 Page 4 of 34 PageID #: 1970

Case 1:20-cv-02578-BMC Document 76 Filed 04/28/22 Page 7 of 34 PageID #: 1973 PROCEEDINGS 1 protocols here, pursuant to the plaintiffs' own understanding 2 and admission, is letters rogatory. 3 Your Honor, if I may just briefly --MR. ROCCO: 4 THE COURT: No, I'll hear from you, Mr. Rocco. 5 MR. ROCCO: Okav. 6 THE COURT: Go ahead and finish, Ms. Fornos. 7 MS. FORNOS: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 I simply was trying to emphasis the most important 9 issue for us is preserving our right to challenge. 10 And the Court is -- it may very well happen, the 11 letters rogatory will happen, or another ruling will affect 12 that. But we do want to preserve our rights. 1.3 THE COURT: I don't want you to. I mean, I 14 understand what you're saying, but at the end of the day, 15 you're going to get served one way or another. So your rights 16 are illusory. It's like -- it's going to get done. Why make 17 them litigate it? 18 Yes, you're right. If it's improper service and 19 they get a judgment, then the judgment won't be enforceable 20 against you, that's fine. But they're going to get proper 21 service one way or the other. Don't we have enough to talk 22 about?

All right, here's what I'm going to do. Go to your client, Ms. Fornos, and tell them, The judge would really appreciate it if on this ministerial point they not insist on

23

24

THE COURT: All right. Next, and I think this

And although they concede that there are special

plaintiffs is too remote to qualify.

24

grandchildren. We're talking about -- there's such a distance. And we do believe that there are some deficiencies there, which we're prepared to highlight in a brief.

23

24

regard to personal jurisdiction.

1 As I understand the flow of money, as alleged in the 2 complaint, we're talking about QC putting money in the banks, 3 the banks running it through New York in their correspondent 4 accounts, and then the banks further giving it, putting it in 5 accounts in the West Bank or Gaza, to which it goes to terrorist organizations. 6 7 First of all, is there any dispute? 8 And let me ask, Mr. Rocco: Have I said it right as 9 to how you see the flow of money? 10 MR. ROCCO: You have said it right, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Okay. And then I want to know from any 12 of the defendants that want to talk to me: Why doesn't the 1.3 use of the New York correspondent accounts, as part of that 14 stream of money, suffice for personal jurisdiction purposes? 15 (No response heard.) 16 THE COURT: We all agree it does. 17 MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: Your Honor, this is Doug 18 Hallward-Driemeier. I'm going to let Ms. Fornos address that. 19 Because the allegations in the complaint about the 20 transactions have to do with her client, Mr. Al Rayan. 21 The allegations with respect to the second bank, 22 Qatar National Bank, are not that QNC made any transactions 23 through New York. Those allegations of the correspondent banking relationship are solely made with respect to MAR. 24 25 So after Ms. Fornos speaks, I'll speak to this

1.3

PROCEEDINGS

in paragraph 130 that has a specific time frame and a specific amount, although they collectively lump defendants together, and they don't even say that that went through correspondent banking. So our position is that they haven't met the purposeful availment.

But even if they do, Your Honor, there is still the requirement under the Long-Arm Statute that there needs to be a nexus, a nexus between the actual corresponding activity that ties them to New York. And I would underscore that our client does not have branches in New York, does not operate in New York, and the final wrongful illegal act. The illegal act of these individuals.

And we would agree that the Court frame the flow of money correctly, but there's nuances in that flow. They're so generalized allegations of: We have one client, one customer, that allegedly uses this correspondent bank, not — there's no other allegations as in *Kaplan* where we have exemptions being given, CTRs being waived.

No, just generalized use of correspondent banking, which goes back to Qatar Charity local branches, which then allegedly, some unspecified sums, unspecified amounts, goes to unidentified affiliates of Hamas and PIJ, and thereafter somehow makes their way to the individual attackers who caused these injuries.

The attenuation here is insufficient for

1.3

PROCEEDINGS

jurisdiction. And, Your Honor, this is actually dovetails into the ATA and JASTA, because there isn't enough for general awareness.

And these issues are all intertwined, the jurisdiction and the ATA and JASTA are all part of the same deficiency that permeates this complaint.

THE COURT: Well, that raises a possibility in my mind, and I think the defendants have to think about this, because it's a personal jurisdiction issue, there's really no need at all for Mr. Rocco to have alleged anything about it in the complaint. You don't have to allege a personal jurisdiction in a complaint. Rule 8(a) doesn't say anything about a personal jurisdiction.

The fact that he has, means that I can consider those allegations in opposition to a motion to dismiss on that ground. But it also seems to me that it might require discovery, as it often does in a personal jurisdiction context, and the defendants might have to give up a lot of discovery, as a preliminary issue, at an early date, before I would be comfortable dismissing it on a lack of personal jurisdiction grounds.

I'm not saying that that should dissuade you from making your motions, I just think you need to be aware of it.

And I also -- I agree, Ms. Fornos, that the personal jurisdiction issue in this respect is kind of intertwined with

PROCEEDINGS

the substantive issues. And when that happens, the authority generally suggests that we do the discovery as part of merits discovery, and then I would hold decision on the personal jurisdiction issue until a later date, which might even be trial.

So I'm not sure if it's, again, worth the defendants making the motion, even though I think you might absolutely be right, just be aware that I'm likely to order some discovery on it if I find any dispute about the facts, and we may have a hearing on it, and that hearing may be the day before trial or during trial. Okay? So just keep that in mind.

MS. FORNOS: Understood, Your Honor.

I think we would just ask the Court to consider it, and we will brief this, that it's a gatekeeping issue, and the initial jurisdiction can also be stayed. And on a 12(b)(6), the Court can look at the allegations and determine that there isn't even the bear minimum threshold to warrant an ATA claim or a JASTA claim and, therefore, there is no reason to get to the issue of jurisdiction.

THE COURT: I disagree with you on that.

Well, you're saying that I can view the jurisdiction issue as part of the 12(b)(6). I don't agree with that.

I think the jurisdiction issue, whether it's subject matter or personal jurisdiction, as here, is a separate thing, and it allows me to go beyond the complaint, because as I

allegations about personal jurisdiction, although lawyers commonly do it.

If what you're saying is, I'll never get to that

1.3

If what you're saying is, I'll never get to that personal jurisdiction issue because I will have dismissed the complaint under 12(b)(6) prior to that, yes, that's fine.

Okay, that would work, if it comes out that way.

All right. Any of the other counsel want to comment on that aspect of it?

MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: Thank you, Your Honor.

Doug Hallward-Driemeier for QNB again.

With respect to Qatar National Bank, the issue is a bit different. Because as Ms. Fornos indicates, all of the allegations with respect to correspondent banking relationships and transfers through those New York correspondent banks had to do with MAR.

The allegations with respect to QNB are simply that they were maintaining accounts for QC and certain individuals in Qatar.

The way that the plaintiffs indicate in their premotion letter that they expect to obtain personal jurisdiction over QNB is under a theory of conspiracy jurisdiction. And they cite two cases. They cite Allianz and Schwab for that.

But Allianz and Schwab did not concern the threshold

1.3

PROCEEDINGS

question of statutory jurisdiction over the person. They think — and those two cases, both of them, identify that statutory jurisdiction was conceded, and the Court merely proceeded to the threshold, to the second question of constitution of the outer bounds of due process under the constitution.

But here, we have a statutory jurisdiction problem.

Because New York's Long-Arm Statute does not employee the doctrine of conspiracy jurisdiction.

Your Honor recognized that in the *Dental Supplies* case, and two cases, at least, I think there are multiple, since *Schwab* and *Allianz* have reiterated that with respect to New York's Long-Arm Statute.

And that's because New York's Long-Arm Statute, 302(a), uses the phrase "person or agent". And the courts have construed that reference to agent to adopt principles of principle agent law, and that the principle must direct, and to some degree control, the agent for the actions within the jurisdiction here in New York to be ascribed to the principle.

So here with respect to QNB, it's not an inadequacy of factual allegations, there are no factual -- rather, I should say there are no factual disputes. It's rather that the theory of personal jurisdiction is legally deficient.

And because we don't meet the statutory jurisdictional question, you don't ever get to the issue

PROCEEDINGS

addressed in Schwab and Allianz.

1.3

THE COURT: But might we not still get into discovery, because the plaintiff doesn't know the full scope of the relationships here? And even under the narrow statutory defense that you're trying to raise to personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff is entitled to that information before you say, Oh, well, you know, we're just not an agent under the Long-Arm Statute?

MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: Well, though, Your Honor, as I understand the cases, they would allow personal jurisdiction where there are questions of jurisdictional factual disputes related to personal jurisdiction, but here that's not the dispute.

The dispute is whether as a matter of law there is such a document in New York's Long-Arm Statute as conspiracy jurisdiction. Because the allegations about QNB are all about maintaining, merely maintaining, accounts for four customers in Qatar.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand what you're saying and that makes sense.

I just want to caution you that it seems to me that the plaintiffs are, again, not confined by what's alleged in the complaint with regard to personal jurisdiction.

They may come up with a whole new theory that they haven't pled in opposition to a motion to dismiss on personal

that we would have defenses to both, because even if we got to the question of *Schwab* and *Allianz*, there would need to be an

MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: Well, Your Honor, I think

23

24

MR. HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER: I appreciate that, Your Honor. Obviously, I can't blame the deficiencies of an alternative theory until I've seen it. But we will address it at that time.

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: That's the nature of personal

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

jurisdiction. And I think there's a lot of confusion sometimes when attorneys say, Oh, the complaint alleges this, and that's not good enough. You know, you have to say, There is no personal jurisdiction, it's a fact as to what happened. And that's going to be your burden -- it's the plaintiffs' burden to prove there is personal jurisdiction. But you have to go forward at least and show there's a basis to find that there's not. Okay, I think we're on the same page. Mr. Hillebrecht, do you need to add something? MR. HILLEBRECHT: Just very briefly, Your Honor, taking the points that have been made. I just wanted to remind the Court, as we set forth in our premotion letter, we are very differently situated. Unlike the defendants in Licci and all the other cases that I'm sure the plaintiffs will rely on with our codefendants, we're not a bank. And we cited Your Honor to the Berdeaux case, Judge Caproni's decision -- for the reporter it's B-E-R-D-E-A-U-X -- which very forcibly came out for the view that the theory followed in that case, or pushed by the plaintiff in that case, was not sensible. Because it makes no sense for a customer in a position like Qatar Charity, where, again, the allegation is,

we have money in Qatar that we want to get to our own bank

1.3

accounts in the Palestinian territories. We have no desire to send it through New York, it makes no sense for us to send it through New York, and we're totally indifferent (audio interference.)

THE COURT: But do you know, though, that it's been sent through New York?

MR. HILLEBRECHT: So *Berdeaux* holds, broadly and specifically, that knowledge is not enough. That it has to be purposeful availment. It has to be directed by the customer.

Here it's -- and I understand what Your Honor just said about what needs and does not need to be in the complaint, but I do think it's significant. There's no allegation in the complaint that the customer, Qatar Charity, directed that they use the New York banks.

And as *Licci*, too, and other cases that I know Your Honor's familiar with and made clear, it's not necessary to do so. For this kind of transfer, from one foreign jurisdiction to another, it is not necessary to go through New York.

And one of the points we're going to make in the motion, Your Honor, is, you know, accepting at face value for the moment the core allegations here; i.e., that Qatar Charity was sending funds to U.S.-designated terrorist organizations, why would we purposefully send money into the United States when there's no need to do so?

So I just wanted to flag for Your Honor that that's

PROCEEDINGS

the argument that we have, none of the other defendants do, and we would be pursuing.

THE COURT: Okay.

1.3

Mr. Rocco, one of the things that does concern me is, you know, to get by on personal jurisdiction, whether it's in your complaint or extraneous to your complaint, you're going to have to raise a prima facie case, I believe, under the case law that there is personal jurisdiction. And I'll either assume that the evidence you produced, or the arguments that you make are accurate, or I'll order discovery to see if they are, one way or the other.

But in doing that, you know, looking at this complaint, it does seem to me that there's a lot of lumping together of defendants who might have behaved very differently.

And I think on personal jurisdiction, you can't just put a label of conspiracy on them and say that's our argument, you're going to have to show me some basis by which a conspiracy was reached.

Now maybe that means I should put off personal jurisdiction until all the discovery has been done, but you're going to have to think about how you want to approach it.

Because like I've been saying to the defendants, the complaint -- if I assume what's in the complaint is true, I'm not sure that's enough for personal jurisdiction.

1.3

PROCEEDINGS

MR. ROCCO: Well, on the issue of the complaint,

Your Honor, I do want to clear up one thing, because I think

it's been misstated. That respectfully with respect to my

cocounsel, the complaint unequivocally alleges that QNB's New

York correspondent accounts process U.S. dollars to go to

Hamas and PIJ.

We couldn't be clearer, paragraph 6 and 13 of the complaint. Paragraph 13 says, "Qatar National Bank and Masraf Al Rayan bank purposefully and knowingly effectuated U.S. dollar-denominated funds transfers on behalf of Qatar Charity to banks in New York."

Now, of course, we've not had discovery, Your Honor, so we were able to make that general allegation, but these confidential bank records are not available to folks like us, but (audio interference) Qatar Charity staffer in Israel, we wouldn't have had the detail we have on Masraf Al Ryan.

But we think -- that's the kind of thing

(indiscernible) give us, Your Honor, the correspondent

accounts that the records exist that we've alleged not only

did they maintain accounts for Qatar Charity and QNB, but also

for these notorious Hamas fugitives. And we've alleged that

those accounts were used to fund Hamas and PIJ terrorism.

Now I think the one thing that's not acknowledged and been ignored specific allegations of the complaint, but the general allegations here that distinguish this case from

1.3

PROCEEDINGS

any of the cases they cite, and the cases that like QC, Qatar Charity, can say that this regular customer has no idea what's going on and the bank has been used by U.S. bank.

That's not this case, Your Honor. This case is unique in the sense that you have the government of Qatar, and the royal family of Qatar, they are openly sponsoring Hamas terrorism. They're pledged publicly a billion dollars to Hamas.

They've been sanctioned for doing that by various countries. The U.S. -- they've been called out in the U.S. and Congress and by Treasury for being a permissive state for financing terrorism. They've been criticized for supporting Hamas. And then (audio interference) is in a dominant position on each one of these defendants' boards and controls these defendants.

So the notion that they didn't know what was going on here, or that we haven't satisfied that level of scienter, we've got more than we normally would have in a case like this to get out of the gate on a claim.

And the notion that Qatar Charity had no idea that they were going to access the U.S. banking system, we're talking millions of dollars. They had to access it. They needed dollars, as alleged in the complaint.

Hamas and PIJ wants dollars. They don't want sheckles. They don't want euros. They don't want, you know,

PROCEEDINGS

lyra, or anything else we can think of, they had to have dollars.

2.

1.3

And to have that quantity of dollars, they knew that they were going to access the U.S. banking system. It wasn't because they casually decided it, they had to. And they did it in a way to try to remove the direct role of Qatar and the government by using these entities they controlled, the two banks and Qatar Charity.

And Qatar Charity is not some innocent customer here, Your Honor. As alleged in the complaint, they've been sanctioned by just about every democracy in the world for being a sponsor of terrorism.

They were sanctioned by the U.S. as a Category III financier of terrorism. They were sanctioned by Israel and banned from --

THE COURT: You're still going to have to tie it up to this case, right?

MR. ROCCO: Understood.

It's not a coincidence, Your Honor, you have the Qatar royal family in control of these entities. That bespeaks the conspiracy we're talking about.

You have an open and notorious sponsorship of Hamas to start, and then you have them infiltrating these entities and pursuing this scheme or their will to finance these terrorist activities.

1.3

PROCEEDINGS

I just respectfully say, Your Honor, that's the setting here which distinguishes this case from just about any other case that they are citing in these papers. It's a different set of circumstances.

I think it permeates not only the personal jurisdiction issue, which Your Honor has aptly set out the issues, but it permeates the merits as well.

We're hearing that they have this activity -- first of all for jurisdiction, Masraf is saying, Well, this is not connected enough to New York. Well, it was essential, Judge.

The statement is the activity in New York has to be not completely (audio interference) from the claims we have here. It was essential to the claims we have here that they got U.S. dollars. And that's been alleged in the complaint. That's what Hamas requires. That's what PIJ requires.

And so this is not a case where there's some casual glance to New York and that's why here. It's here because they needed U.S. dollars, and that's where they could get them.

THE COURT: I got your point. All right, I understand the arguments on that.

The last thing I want to talk about, and only briefly having touched upon it, because it is somewhat intertwined, is the adequacy of the complaint to state a claim.

PROCEEDINGS

29

1 I just want to know, Mr. Rocco, are you really 2 pressing the primary liability theory, or is this strictly a 3 secondary liability case? 4 MR. ROCCO: Your Honor, I think we've alleged both, 5 because we do have Your Honor's decision, as well as others, 6 that show, that demonstrate, that the financing activity here 7 that we needn't have a direct -- I think the defendants argue 8 that we have to show they were pointing the trigger and they 9 weren't the committing the violent acts. But as Your Honor has held in the context of direct 10 11 claims, it's enough to have this kind of direct financing with 12 knowledge that we've alleged that itself is the dangerous to 1.3 human life activity that satisfies the statute. 14 So I think -- if you ask me (indiscernible) 15 certainly it's easier for us to demonstrate aiding and 16 abetting liability here, but that's not to say we don't have a 17 direct ATA claim. 18 THE COURT: And an opposition to a 12(b)(6) motion, 19 you're going to continue to assert the direct liability 20 theory? 21 MR. ROCCO: I think we have a basis to do so, Your 22 Honor, so we would. 23 THE COURT: Okay. I don't know that that's the way you're going to prevail in this case. I quess everything in a 24 25 case this big is important, but you might consider, you know,

We agree with Qatar Charity, Your Honor.

Okay.

THE COURT:

MR. ROCCO:

24

And also, Your Honor, I don't know if the Court intends to discuss the issue of page limits, because we would

24